Critical points and reinterpretations of Libet's results present in my target article, as well as in my previous paper in Consciousness and Cognition (Gomes, 1998) , have generally received support from the commentaries about the various target articles (with the exception of Libet's own commentary).
I. Response to Libet
Libet implies that one should not put forward hypotheses and speculative interpretations if one has not done an experimental test of them. However, in physics, which is a paradigm within scientific disciplines, the role of theoreticians is traditionally 2 recognized. Many physical theories and hypotheses have been published before they could be subject to experimental test.
On the other hand, if an experimenter has not considered simpler alternative hypotheses and has not controlled for them in his experimental design, the conclusions he draws from his data are as speculative as those of someone who has found these data to agree with a different interpretation. Only a suitably designed crucial experiment can decide between two alternative hypotheses.
Libet's only evidence for his backward referral hypothesis is the difference in results between peripheral-cortical (P-C) and peripheral-lemniscal (P-LM) couplings. However, he failed to observe some elementary precautions for controlling the variables. In P-LM coupling, the peripheral stimulus was a weak train of skin pulses, while in P-C coupling it was either a relatively strong single skin pulse or a visual flash! How can one consider these stimuli as commensurate?
Additionally, if he had systematically varied the intensity of the cerebral stimuli (leading to different Minimum Train Durations, MTD), he would have controlled for the effect of a possible shorter post-MTD latency 1 in P-LM couplings, relative to that in P-C couplings, when the parameters are those he used in the reported tests (Gomes, 1998, p. 584 and Fig. 6 ).
Contrary to what Libet states, the main alternative hypotheses I have proposed are fully testable, and the conditions of such tests were explicitly discussed in my 1998 paper (Gomes, 1998, sections 4.6 and 7, pp. 583-584, 593) .
I concede that the possibility of repeated evoked responses (EP) accounting for a shorter LM latency is speculative, but the hypothesis of a shorter LM latency itself could have easily been tested. The argument of the possible role of repeated EPs was simply meant to counter the assumption that LM-latency should be similar to C-latency, by 3 showing that the two conditions of stimulation produce very different effects on the somatosensory cortex.
As in his previous reply, Libet insists that the use of weak skin stimuli in P-LM coupling would only justify increasing the sensory latency by the 30 ms of their MTD. It is a wellknown psychophysical fact that latency in general depends on stimulus intensity (see Breitmeyer's commentary). The point is not the presence of a MTD. Suppose two supraliminal single pulses differ in intensity. In this case, there is no MTD, but the latency of the weaker stimulus may be longer, simply as a consequence of the difference in intensity (Roufs, 1963; Wilson & Anstis, 1969) . Libet not only ignores this fact but also calls it a "nonsensical proposal".
He clearly evades the methodological flaw of comparing couplings (P-LM and P-C) in which very different peripheral stimuli were used. According to this view, there must be a delay between the intention (or sensation) and consciousness of the intention (or sensation).
Once we admit the existence of nonconscious mental states, we may consider that some become conscious while others do not. Thus Rosenthal can assume that the initial part of the RP corresponds to a preparatory volition that does not become conscious, while a later part of it (possibly the lateralized readiness potential, LRP)
corresponds to a volition that initiates the action and becomes conscious.
Concerning free will, Rosenthal defends its compatibility with the neural determination of voluntary actions. His version of compatibilism, however, seems to me a bit deflationary in relation to the freedom of the will. We are often conscious of many mental antecedents of our conscious volitions (our reasons), but we feel that although these reasons may have a role in their causal determination, they are not sufficient. We feel that, if an action is free, we must have chosen it. This means that we feel ourselves as a necessary cause of our free actions.
The whole problem is that we are not usually inclined to view our own agency as a property of a certain neural system in our brain. If we admit this, however, we can keep our intuition that our free actions are caused "by us" and not by any external or internal determinants that do not belong to this mental/neural system (our self).
We may also admit that we do not become conscious of all that occurs in this system.
From this perspective, we may consider even the onset of the RP as a consequence of the activity of this system, though not yet corresponding to a conscious intention to act now or to the irrevocable decision that causes the action. In this way, we can save our intuition of being the true initiators of our voluntary actions.
